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I.

Introduction

On February 18, 2019, the Center on International Commercial
Arbitration1 (Arbitration Center) and the U.S. & International AntiCorruption Law Program2 (Anti-Corruption Program) cosponsored a panel titled Handling Allegations of Corruption in
Arbitration and Judicial Dispute Resolution at American
University Washington College of Law (AUWCL). It was the first
time the Arbitration Center joined forces with the Anti-Corruption
Program to provide expert analysis on the cross-cutting issue of
corruption. Thanks to this cooperation, it was possible to bring
together an interdisciplinary panel of expert practitioners,
including a U.S. district court judge, academics, and arbitration
practitioners to explore corruption issues in both international
arbitration and domestic litigation and postulate the consequences
that such issues can have across diverse legal fields, the economy,
and government.
AUWCL Professor Susan Franck opened the event by stating
that the panel occurs at a time when the world is witnessing a sharp
rise in nationalist sentiment and a resurgence in calls for the
removal from international legal bodies. Franck acknowledged
however, that at the same time, there are increased calls for active
arbitral tribunals and judiciaries to parse out the issues in resolving
disputes containing allegations of corruption. Examples Professor
Adjunct Faculty and Fellow, Center on International Commercial Arbitration,
and Assistant Director for International Curriculum Development, International
and Comparative Legal Studies, at American University Washington College of
Law. For any comments, please contact arp@american.edu.
** Law Clerk, Wiley Rein LLP. Editor-in-Chief of the Arbitration Brief, 201719.
1 For more information on the Center on International Commercial Arbitration,
see online at www.wcl.american/arbitration.
2 For more information on the U.S. & International Anti-Corruption Law
Program, see online at www.wcl.american/anti-corruption.
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Franck pointed out include the EU proposal for an investment
court, calls for an international court of civil justice, and an
international corruption court. Quoting a World Bank study that
found corruption costs the world economy about $2 trillion per
year,3 Professor Franck acknowledged that corruption still
maintains a stronghold in international economics. Franck
concluded that because of these ongoing developments, this
panel s e ploration of comple corruption issues that arise out of
international economic law is both timely and relevant.
Nancy Boswell, Director of the US and International AntiCorruption Law Certificate Program and Adjunct Professor at
AUWCL, moderated the panel. In her introductory remarks,
Boswell underlined the central importance of corruption as an
issue that may arise in both arbitration and domestic court
proceedings. She pointed out that corruption affects not only the
business community, but also environmental and human rights
protection efforts.
Boswell continued by taking stock of where the international
community currently finds itself in relation to handling allegations
of corruption. She emphasized that achieving international
consensus on issues of corruption remains a key challenge.
Although there is still no universal definition for corruption,
Boswell commented that international consensus has been reached
on the fact that corruption is harmful, wrong, and an unacceptable
cost to pay. She stated that consensus has also been reached in
legal regimes, citing the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,4
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 5 and the UN
To illustrate this point, the United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General António
Guterres stated on the International Anti-Corruption Day on December 9, 2018,
that the World Economic Forum estimates the global cost of corruption is at
least $2.6 trillion, or 5 percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP). He
further indicated that according to the World Bank, businesses and individuals
pay more than $1 trillion in bribes every year. See Secretary-General's Message
for 2018, available online at
https://www.un.org/en/events/anticorruptionday/messages.shtml.
4 Adopted on December 17, 1997, U.N.T.S. vol. 2802, I-49274.
5 Adopted on March 29, 1996, OAS Series B-58.
3
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Convention Against Corruption 6 as prime examples. Although
none of these conventions explicitly define corruption, Boswell
noted that these conventions do enumerate criminal acts, which
include active and passive bribery.
Despite these hard-fought developments, Boswell made it clear
that the anti-corruption field is a work in progress, highlighted by
the significant cultural differences among nations with respect to
corruption. She called attention to these differences when looking
at some of the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA).7 While this legislation contains an exception for
facilitation payments, such payments might be viewed as bribes in
other countries or regions of the world. Additionally, while the
FCPA prohibits giving gifts to foreign officials, this may be seen
as customary in other cultures. Boswell concluded that these
cultural differences and approaches to corruption are particularly
important when such an allegation arises before a court or arbitral
tribunal.
II. Cross-Cutting Issues of Corruption in Judicial and Arbitral
Dispute Settlement
Lucinda Low, Partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP, began her
remarks by putting the discussion about corruption into the context
of the intersection between white-collar crime and international
arbitration. In tracing the development of international standards
and national laws on corruption, Low opined that the process
began with the concept of criminalization. This process included
the criminalization of various acts of corruption, provided
infrastructure for cooperation among countries in corruption
investigations, and established some limited preventative
measures.
Low then noted that criminalization prompted an increase in
enforcement activities by national governments for those who have
political will and capacity to investigate. She commented that
multi-jurisdictional cases are increasing because multiple countries
can have jurisdiction over the same criminal conduct, as long as
6
7

Adopted on October 31, 2003, U.N. Doc. A/58/422; U.N.T.S., vol. 2349, p. 41.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq.
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the crime crossed national borders. This has led to a spillover
effect, where some civil cases that included allegations of
corruption have prompted criminal prosecutions under national
law. Low highlighted this stage of development by the Aluminum
Bahrain B.S.C. (Alba) v. Alcoa, Inc. case. In this case, Alba, an
Alcoa customer, sued Alcoa in the United States claiming that the
contracts they entered into were tainted by corruption and sought
damages. The civil case led to a criminal prosecution and Alcoa
ultimately paid substantial fines. 8
Low noted that in a majority of international disputes,
arbitration is a more popular form of dispute resolution than
litigation. In recent years, she commented that there has been a
large increase in corruption allegations arising in both commercial
and investor-state arbitration disputes. One case that will play out
over the coming years and led to new developments in the
prevention and sanctioning of corruption is the Brazilian
Odebrecht case.
Low explained that the corruption issue is typically asserted as
a defense in arbitration. In commercial arbitration, it may be an
agent suing for money under an agency contract and the
respondent s defense is that the agent acted corruptl , or that the
contract was procured by corruption. In the investor-state context,
Low noted that typically the state claims that the investment was
either procured through corruption or performed in a corrupt
manner. If the investment treaty requires that the investment be
made in accordance with the local law, these state claims raise
issues of jurisdiction. Otherwise, Low explained, the corruption
defense raises issues of claim admissibility and the question for the
tribunal to decide becomes whether corruption is a concept of
international public policy. Low noted that sometimes the tribunal
raises the issue of corruption by itself. The possibility of sua
sponte action by the tribunal depends on the powers and duties of
See Department of Justice Press Release, Alcoa World Alumina Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Pay $223 Million in Fines and Forfeiture,
January 9, 2014, available online at https://star.worldbank.org/corruptioncases/sites/corruptioncases/files/ALBA_Alcoa_US_DOJ_SEC_Settlement_PR_Jan_9_2014.pdf.
8
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arbitrators. In fact, Low indicated that arbitrators may be at risk if
the do not further investigate red flags , or indicators of
corruption.
Low then discussed how issues of proof are central to dealing
with corruption allegations in arbitration. When corruption
allegations are raised in arbitration, and the home or host
government has done no investigation, the tribunal is left to its own
fact-finding resources. In these circumstances, Low commented
that there are big debates among parties and institutions as to what
the burden or standards of proof are to prove corruption. These are
some unanswered and contentious questions that Low stressed are
key for the legal community to work out in the coming years.
When a tribunal reaches a finding of corruption, Low stated
that the tribunal must determine the consequences of this
wrongdoing. An example of the consequences for a finding of
corruption may be the dismissal of the claim for lack of
jurisdiction, even if the party performed under the contract, or the
state received benefits under the contract. Low noted that the key
case that dealt with findings of corruption is World Duty Free v.
Kenya.9 In this investor-state case, a principal shareholder of the
claimant submitted an affidavit admitting that he paid a bribe to the
President of Kenya. The principal shareholder claimed that it was a
customary payment for doing business in the country. The tribunal
concluded that paying the bribe violated public policy and
dismissed the claim. Strikingly, Low mentioned that the tribunal
refused to attribute the conduct of the President of Kenya to the
state, and as a result, Kenya got to keep benefits conferred under
the contract by World Duty Free until that point in time. This
decision was highly controversial and left arbitrators, practitioners,
and academics wondering what the consequences should be in
such cases. Low concluded her comments by highlighting that
because states no perceive corruption defenses to be a get-outof-jail-free-card, states ill lodge aggressive investigations into
investor companies when there are legal disputes in order to build
a corruption defense that can defeat an arbitration claim.
World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7,
Award of October 4, 2006.
9
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III. Corruption and the Judiciary
The Honorable Judge Carlos Acosta, an Associate Justice at the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, began his
discussion of corruption allegations before U.S. courts with a
reference to a U.S. Senate Report which stated that when bribes are
paid, contracts don t go to the most efficient producer but to the
most corrupt. For these reasons, Judge Acosta stated that enforcing
anti-corruption measures is sound public policy that also protects
taxpayers.
Discussing the history of the FCPA, Judge Acosta mentioned
that some of the key reasons why this legislation was passed was
due to cases of foreign bribery by Lockheed Martin and Chiquita.
These cases gave rise to public uncertainty and dissatisfaction in
the conduct of U.S. public companies doing business abroad, and
ultimately led to the passage of the FCPA in 1977. Explaining the
two central prongs of the FCPA, transparency of securities and
bribery of foreign officials, Judge Acosta narrowed the scope of
his comments to the latter. Judge Acosta pointed out that when
looking at the regulation of bribery of foreign officials under the
FCPA, the law does not ban facilitation payments, otherwise
kno n as greasing the heel pa ments. He stressed that
although the FCPA may not prohibit these forms of payments,
national laws may, and so any U.S. business or individual doing
business abroad should be very cognizant of the legal regime that
they are working under.
Delving into some major cases under the FCPA, Judge Acosta
highlighted the 2008 Siemens AG case, which resulted in a $450
million fine.10 He also noted the 2012 Marubeni Corporation
FCPA violation, which resulted in a $54 million fine for acting as
an agent for a joint venture in Nigeria, where the corporation paid
$51 million in bribes to Nigerian officials. 11 Judge Acosta noted
See SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery, Press
Release No. 2008-294, SEC Docket, (2008), available online at
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm.
11 See Marubeni Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $54.6 Million Criminal Penalty, Press
Release No. 12-060, Dep t of Just. Docket (2012), available online at
10
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that courts do not often hold formal trials in these cases. Instead,
the suspect companies are offered deferred prosecution agreements
in order to talk, pay a substantial fine, and ultimately avoid jail
time. Reflecting on his time as a prosecutor, Judge Acosta stated
that the difficulty in FCPA cases is proving the corrupt conduct or
scheme.
Turning to a major government procurement corruption case,
Judge Acosta discussed the Fat Leonard scandal. This scandal
involved Leonard Glen Francis, a Malaysian national, and his
company Glen Defense Marine Asia, which supplied U.S. Navy
ships with rations, supplies, and services when they came into
ports across the Pacific Rim region. In order to win these resupply
contracts, Francis bribed high-ranking members of the U.S. Navy
with vacations, shows, prostitutes, cigars, and cash payments.
More than 550 members of the U.S. Navy were investigated in this
scandal, 33 of whom were prosecuted. 12 Judge Acosta alluded to
how the Fat Leonard scandal and other cases in the federal
procurement arena highlighted major areas of fraud in government
procurement work. These areas include violations of the Buy
American Act, unmet labor standards, overbilling, double-billing,
price gouging, counterfeit products, and kickback schemes. 13
Judge Acosta concluded that the U.S. government fortunately has
the resources to investigate when there is a complaint of
wrongdoing in the U.S., which ultimately leads to court
proceedings and convictions under the U.S. anti-corruption legal
regime.
IV. Corruption Allegations in International Arbitration
The third speaker, Aloysius (Louie) Llamzon, a Senior
Associate in the International Arbitration group at King &
Spalding LLP, began by noting that it is alarming to both
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/marubeni-corporation-resolves-foreign-corruptpractices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-546.
12 See Craig Whitlock & Kevin Uhrmacher, Prostitutes, Vacations and Cash:
The Navy Official Fa Leona d Took Do n, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 2018,
available online at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/seducing-the-seventhfleet/.
13 Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 8301 8303 (2012).
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arbitrators and practitioners when corruption is alleged, or even
when the issue of corruption is raised in international arbitration
cases. Llamzon traced some of the history of corruption in
international arbitration and commented that it has been an issue in
this field since the 1960s. Despite this, the first landmark case that
addressed corruption in international arbitration, World Duty Free
Ltd. v. Kenya, was not concluded until 2006.14
Llamzon discussed the differences between investment and
commercial arbitration in relation to a finding of corruption and
noted that the investor-state arbitration system was designed in part
to minimize global corruption forces. However, Llamzon
highlighted an interesting aspect of how this dynamic has unfolded
over the years when he pointed out that states assert corruption
defenses against investors for conduct in which public officials are
equally complicit more than two-thirds of the time. Distinguishing
commercial arbitration corruption cases, Llamzon noted that most
of these cases arise out of contracts for corruption that take the
form of agency agreements between a seller and an agent who
helps to secure a contract for the seller by peddling insider
influence. When the agency contract is not fully performed or
upheld, these contracts are sent to arbitration. A second, less
common type of commercial arbitration corruption case is the type
of case where corruption taints the consent of a party. Llamzon
noted that these cases are similar to common law cases of
contractual fraud.
Llamzon next questioned whether there are real differences
between the consequences of investor-state and commercial
arbitration corruption cases. He started by noting that corruption
can be seen as an issue of jurisdiction, admissibility, or the merits
in the investor-state context. However, Llamzon noted an
interesting caveat related to state responsibility in investor-state
corruption cases: in such cases, a finding of corrupt conduct by a
public official, or even a head of state, is not attributed to the state
World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Rep. of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7,
Agreement for the construction, maintenance, and operation of duty-free
complexes at Nairobi and Mombasa International Airports (Oct. 4, 2006),
available online at https://www.italaw.com/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf.
14
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itself. In the commercial context, on the other hand, Llamzon
explained that the contract is usually voidable or void ab initio as a
principle of public policy because such a case is examined through
the lens of national law. Yet even in such circumstances where the
contract is voidable or void ab initio, the seller may be able to
obtain non-contractual remedies for the cost of the goods they sold
or other minor costs they incurred.
Llamzon concluded with a discussion on the impact of
domestic proceedings connected to arbitral decisions in which he
considered two distinct corruption situations. In the first situation,
which is similar to Siemens v. Argentina, an investor wins an
award and later pleads guilty in a national investigation of corrupt
conduct related to the same contract, after which the investor is
obligated to withdraw their acceptance of the arbitration award. 15
In the second situation, which is similar to Niko Resources Ltd. v.
Bangl. Petroleum Expl. & Prod. Co. Ltd., the arbitral tribunal takes
a more nuanced view of corruption. In this situation, the tribunal
holds that even if an investor pleads guilty in national courts to
engaging in corrupt conduct while securing a contract, the
corruption must taint the investment itself through an element of
causation for the guilty party to be forced to relinquish all claims to
an arbitration award.16 If the opposing party cannot prove that
causation connects the corrupt conduct to the investment, the
arbitration can proceed.
V. Proving Corruption: The Role of Financial Experts
The final speaker of the panel, Boris Steffen, the Senior
Managing Director of GlassRatner Advisory & Capital Group,
discussed the roles and responsibilities that financial experts have
responding to corruption allegations and conducting relevant
Siemens v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Termination of a
contract for Siemens to implement an immigration control, personal
identification, and electoral information system, including national identity cards
(Jan. 17, 2007), available online at
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0790.pdf.
16 Niko Res. Ltd. v. Bangl. Petroleum Expl. & Prod. Co. Ltd., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/18, Gas purchase and sale agreement, available online at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB%2f10
%2f18.
15
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investigations. Steffen first touched on the role of a financial
expert in these cases, noting that financial experts must refute
allegations of fraud by using their auditing and accounting skills to
establish fact patterns and relationships. Steffen stated that there is
a clear red line in the role of such experts, cautioning that it is
outside of a financial e pert s role and potentially an ethical
violation to draw any conclusions regarding the existence of
fraud. Such conclusions require legal interpretation, and therefore
are outside of financial e perts realm of e pertise.
Steffen then examined the three methods that financial experts
use to collect evidence. The first is data mining, whereby the
experts electronically review large data sets comprised of emails,
ledgers, and other documents to determine relationships between
individuals and other pertinent facts about the case. Steffen
explained that the second method of evidence collection is an
analysis of financial statements, which financial experts use to
highlight unexpected or unanticipated financial relationships
between assets and liabilities, sales forecasts, and costs. The third
method of collecting evidence is by refining the scope of the
investigation. Steffen noted the equal importance of interviews
when conducting such investigations and stated that strategic
interview methodology begins with interviews of third parties who
could have pertinent knowledge regarding the facts at issue. After
financial experts complete the third-party interviews, they
interview any suspected parties followed by direct actors in the
dispute.
Steffen explained that financial experts typically disclose
badges of fraud or red flags that are indicative of fraud hen
reporting or testifying regarding the investigation. Examples of
such red flags include unsupported expense reimbursements for
charges that occurred around the time that a contract was awarded,
or contracts that were awarded to a consultant whose expertise was
not consistent with the contract requirements.
Steffen then listed the three methodologies that financial
experts use when attempting to trace or recover assets, which
include turning an inside witness, executing a covert sting
operation, or conducting an asset-tracing operation using auditing
10
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methods. Steffen explained that, depending on whether the
corruption scheme is classified as an illicit (on-book) or
undisclosed (off-book) scheme, some of these methodologies may
be preferred over others.
Steffen ended by commenting on the difference between
conducting an investigation in an arbitration setting or in a judicial
proceeding. In arbitration cases where an interested individual or
entity is not party to the arbitration agreement, financial experts
may have to deal with issues that arise regarding safeguarding
assets and proving claims. Such issues may require a party to use
only information within their possession to prove a claim if a
tribunal views an investigation into evidence of alleged corrupt
conduct to be outside the scope of the underlying arbitral dispute.
In order to safeguard assets, the interested party may have to go
outside four corners of the arbitral proceedings and request that a
national court freeze the assets. This could alert the opposing party
to the corruption allegation and lead to the sale or disposition of
the relevant assets.
VI. Conclusions
Nancy Boswell concluded the panel by noting that there is
currently some consensus on the harm that corruption causes, the
need to do something about it, and the relevant legal framework.
However, Boswell stated that we are still in the early stages of
standardizing the enforcement mechanisms of corruption actions,
both in national courts and in international arbitral tribunals. For
these reasons, Boswell noted that it is crucial to continue
discussing corruption in international arbitration. In time, this will
allow us to work out the modern issues that practitioners face
while also bringing new ideas to the table regarding how to
generate more widely accepted anti-corruption practices
throughout the legal profession.
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